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Introduction
In recent years hundreds of mostly middle-aged men have claimed that priests of different denominations, but especially the Roman Catholic Church, had sexually assaulted them in their youth. Claims for damages against churches led to protracted court cases in several countries. Such a claim has not yet been brought against any church in South Africa. However, in January 2014 three men in their sixties alleged that a well-known author of religious books and former pastor of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa sexually assaulted them while they were inhabitants of a children's home. Between 1958 and 1964 the pastor (now 87) was the manager of this children's home in Ugie in the Eastern Cape, where he himself was an inhabitant as a boy. One of the men alleged that they did bring the assaults to the attention of the Ugie congregation as well as the Department of Education, but that no steps were taken. 2 No claims have been filed against the church yet.
In cases such as these the public's reaction is one of shock and outrage since the presumed protectors apparently misused their position of trust to sexually assault vulnerable children in their care. On the other hand, accused persons are regarded with sympathy since they are often advanced in years at the time when the claims I will endeavour to indicate what the probable outcome would be if South African courts were to have to decide the vicarious liability of the church in a case of historical sexual abuse of children by priests, ministers or clergymen. Developments in Canada and the United Kingdom will be discussed, since these countries seem to be at the forefront of the development of vicarious liability, as will be indicated below. South African courts, moreover, have in the past sought guidance in jurisprudence in these common law countries in order to develop South Africa's own doctrine of vicarious liability.
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An employment relationship
In a claim against a church based on vicarious liability, the relationship between each denomination and its clergymen will have to be analysed to establish whether an employment relationship did exist at the time of the alleged acts. A hurdle for claimants is that the relationship between a priest and the church was until recently not regarded as an employment relationship, since priests were regarded as servants of God. 9 Churches further argued that neither the church nor corporations registered to perform certain specific functions ancillary to the main purpose of the church could be regarded as employers, since there was no intention to create an employment relationship. the conclusion of contracts and that it acted as the legal interface between the Roman Catholic Church and the community. 12 The court further pointed out that:
... the relationship between the bishop and a priest in a diocese is not only spiritual, but temporal. The priest takes a vow of obedience to the bishop. The bishop exercises extensive control over the priest, including the power of assignment, the power to remove the priest from his post and the power to discipline him. It is akin to an employment relationship.
13
Since the relationship between the wrongdoer and St George's was akin to an employment relationship, the court held that St George's as the secular arm of the church could be both directly and vicariously liable. 14 The court did not make a decision on "the complicated question" of whether the Roman Catholic Church as such could be held liable. The principle adopted in John Doe that a "relationship akin to employment" was found to be sufficient for vicarious liability, instead of an employment contract as previously required, was followed by courts in the United Kingdom.
United Kingdom
In a long line of English cases it was consistently held that ministers of different church denominations, inter alia the Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church and the Church of England, held office in terms of ecclesiastical law. 15 The position of priests was thus not defined by a contract of appointment, 16 since the courts found that there was no intention by the parties to conclude any kind of contract. In
Diocese of Southwark v Coker
17 the court remarked that the law should not impose a legal relationship on members of a religious community which would be contrary to their religious beliefs. According to the court, the relationship should be regulated by the rules of the specific church which is part of the public law of England, and not by a contract between the parties.
I think that difficulty has been caused by some of the reasons given in recent cases for saying that a priest or minister is not an employed person. ... the man appointed in order to do the work of the church with the full authority to fulfil that role, being provided with the premises, the pulpit and the clerical robes. He was directed into the community and given free rein to act as representative of the church. He had been trained and ordained for that purpose and his position of trust gave him great power.
The court found that the relationship was akin to employment and that the Trust could thus be held liable.
The case went on appeal and was heard as JGE v the Diocese of Portsmouth
24
(hereafter JGE). The diocese of Portsmouth argued that priests were not employees, since there was no form of contract between the parties, and that the church viewed priests as officials and as such they were subject to canon law and not civil law. It was further argued that the priest was not an employee, because he was neither entitled to a fixed salary nor under the control of the bishop, since the bishop visited only once in five years.
25
The court agreed with the reasoning in Percy 26 and JGE in the lower court 27 and remarked that, although the priest was not under the constant control of the bishop, the bishop was certainly in a position to remove a priest should the priest act in contravention of church rules. 28 The court held that in keeping with the social purpose of vicarious liability and increasing forms of atypical forms of employment, "the fluid concept of vicarious liability should not … be confined by the concrete demands of statutory construction arising in a wholly different context". 29 In Ward J's judgment "the time has come to recognise that the context in which the question arises cannot be ignored" and that requirements for an employment relationship in other contexts should not be applied to the relationship required for establishing vicarious liability. In JGE the court found that there was in fact control as the priest was subject to the oversight of the bishop and to diocesan laws and regulations. "Abusing a little girl is the most gross breach of ecclesiastical law and if it came to the bishop's knowledge he would be bound to dismiss the priest." 34 Regarding the organisation test, Ward J found that the Roman Catholic Church could be regarded as a "business" with the objective of spreading the word of God. A priest has a central role in meeting that target and "the more relevant the activity is to the fundamental objectives of the business, the more appropriate it is to apply the risk to the business". Regarding the integration test, the court found that "the role of the parish priest is wholly integrated into the organisational structure of the Church's enterprise".
36
Although the priest was not paid a salary, he was also not an entrepreneur. He was required by canon law to live in the parochial house close to his church, which the court said is like an employee making use of the employer's tools of the trade.
37
The court concluded by stating "that the time has come to emphatically announce that the law of vicarious liability has moved beyond the confines of the contract of employment. The test I set myself is whether the relationship of the bishop and
Father Baldwin is so close in character to one of employer/employee that it is just and fair to hold the employer vicariously liable".
38
The decision in JGE was followed in were set out created a contract of employment. The agreement was that the minister would receive a wage (traktament) in exchange for his services to the congregation, which was also regarded as an indication that this was an employment contract.
The court also took the provisions of the "Kerkorde", which inter alia contains rules and regulations for the employment of minsters and the termination of their services into account. 43 From the "Kerkorde" it is clear that the minster is regarded as an employee of the church, since it prescribes the requirements for a fair dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereafter the LRA). The court in Schreuder accepted that the minister served more than one employer entity within the church group, namely the congregation, "die ring" and the synod. In terms of this document, upon the termination of the services of a minster "die ring" (circle of congregations in a certain area, similar to a diocese in the Anglican Church and Roman Catholic Church) disengages the relationship between the congregation and the minister, while the synod further acts as an appeal body. (hereafter "Salvation Army") the court granted a declaratory order to the effect that officers (preachers) of the Salvation Army are not its employees and that the Salvation Army is thus not bound by labour legislation. The reasoning in Church of the Province 47 was followed and, since it was clearly stated in the contract with the officers that no employment relationship is created, the court found that there was no intention to create an employment relationship. 48 The court accepted evidence that the Salvation Army only provides the space for the officer to answer his call of duty to God and that the officer is only given guidance on administrative tasks, not on how God is to be served. The fact that no remuneration is paid, but only a living allowance, and that there was no guarantee that this would be paid, also indicated to the court that there was no employment relationship.
49
What is clear from the above is that the stance of the South African courts was that in the light of the perceived special calling of a priest, he will not be regarded as an employee of the church unless it is clear that there was indeed an intention to create such a relationship, as was demonstrated in Schreuder.
50
Since those judgments were handed down, South African courts have been prepared to hold that even though a contract specifies that it is not an employment contract, the court could, by taking the reality of the relationship into consideration, decide 45 Church of the Province 386. that an employment relationship did exist between the parties. 51 In cases dealing with unfair dismissal, protection was extended to persons who could not strictly be regarded as employees, since they had no valid contracts. In these cases the courts gave effect to the right of fair labour practices conferred on "everyone" in section 23
of the Constitution by regarding these persons as employees.
52
These considerations will not be applicable to the question of whether someone is an employee for the purposes of establishing vicarious liability, since different policy considerations would be at play. However, to protect the victim's constitutional rights to dignity, freedom and security of person, 53 South African courts could develop the common law rule requiring that the wrongdoer must be an employee for the purposes of vicarious liability to require only a relationship akin to employment. 61 This was based on the so-called Salmond rule, which also made provision for liability for acts that were not authorised, on condition that these acts constituted an improper mode of performing authorised acts. 62 The difficulty with this mode of thought was that an employee could not be held liable for an intentional act of misconduct, which could not be seen as "a mode of doing an authorised act." A prime example is sexual assault, which can never be seen as a mode of doing an authorised act.
In Bazley a warden of a school for troubled children (appointed without the management's knowing that he was a paedophile) assaulted the children while performing his duties, namely bathing the children and putting them to bed. employer should be held liable, rather than obscuring this decision with phrases such as the "scope of employment" and "modes of doing authorised acts". 63 The fundamental question was whether the wrongful act was sufficiently connected to the conduct authorised by the employer. The court held that where there is a significant connection between the enhancement of the risk that unlawful conduct will occur (brought about by the enterprise of the employer), it would be generally appropriate to hold the employer liable. Liability in these circumstances would serve the policy considerations of fairly compensating the victim and acting as a deterrent, so that employers would take preventative measures to ensure that such conduct would not occur.
64
McClachlan J pointed out that factors such as the opportunity that the enterprise afforded an employee to abuse his power, the extent of the power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim, and the vulnerability of potential victims should be taken into account to establish if the enterprise enhanced the risk that such wrongful acts could occur. 65 In this case the connection between the authorised duties of the employee and the wrongful acts was regarded as being sufficiently close and the employer was held liabe.
In John Doe 66 the court followed Bazley and found that the bishop provided Bennett with great power in relation to vulnerable victims as well as the opportunity to abuse this power. 67 The remoteness of the parishes, the lack of sophistication of some parishioners 68 and the psychological intimacy inherent in his role as a priest gave him the opportunity to control his victims. 69 The court was satisfied that a strong connection was created between the wrongful acts and the risk which the enterprise introduced into the community. Bolton's authorised role with the defendant church provided him with a greater opportunity than any other member of the community for intimacy with children".
74
It is significant that the court did not exclude the possibility that the unlawful acts of a volunteer could lead to the vicarious liability of a church.
The United Kingdom
Shortly after the decision in Bazley ... what has weighed with the courts has been the fact that the relationship has facilitated the commission of the abuse by placing the abusers in a position where they enjoyed both physical proximity to their victims and the influence of authority over them both as teachers and as men of god.
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The court further stated that the creation of risk in itself is not enough to give rise to vicarious liability for sexual abuse, but it is always an important factual element in establishing vicarious liability. 80 The court emphasised that the children in this case were vulnerable because they were school children living cloistered on the school premises, and their personal histories made it less likely that they would be believed if they disclosed the abuse to anyone. 81 The requirements for a close connection was satisfied, since teachers were placed in a position of authority over vulnerable children, which gave them the opportunity to abuse their position in circumstances in which there was an increased risk that such conduct could occur.
In this decision was that the priest met the victim while he organised sporting events and discos for youths and not while he was engaged in evangelical duties.
The Court of Appeal overturned this decision and held that in order to evangelise people, the priest also had to gain the trust of non-members of the church. In getting to know the victim he was thus ostensibly performing his duties as a priest.
The court concluded that "his role as priest in the Archdiocese gave him the status and opportunity to draw the claimant further into his sexually abusive orbit by ostensibly respectable means connected with his employment as a priest at the Church". 83 The court further remarked that:
A priest has a special role, which involves trust and responsibility in a more general way even than a teacher, a doctor, or a nurse. He is, in a sense, never off duty; thus, he will normally be dressed in "uniform" in public and not just when at his place of work. So, too, he has a degree of general moral authority which no other role enjoys; hence the title of "Father Chris", by which Father Clonan was habitually known. It was his employment as a priest by the Archdiocese which enabled him, indeed was intended to enable him, to hold himself out as having such a role and such authority.
84
The court held that a material increase in the risk of harm occurring as a result of the employment was satisfied in this case.
85
The following factors seem to be a basis for a close connection between the wrongdoer's employment and the wrongful deeds:
1 The position in which the wrongdoer was appointed was a position of trust, respect and authority; 2 the specific duties to promote the goals of the enterprise gave him the opportunity to commit the wrongful acts; 
South Africa
The South African Constitutional 99 The court acknowledged that if a policeman was off duty that would be a relevant factor in determining the closeness of the connection, but held that this factor was rendered less significant by the fact that the policeman nevertheless had the duty to protect the girl and that a vulnerable young girl was led to believe that the policeman had assumed the responsibility to protect her. 100 The connection was found to be sufficiently close. responsibilities, I might have been persuaded that such was not a proper case for the extension of the remedy despite the closeness of the connection.
102
The last sentence is a reason for concern, since the court is apparently not taking into consideration that vicarious liability is a form of strict liability. If direct liability had been the issue, then it could be a defence if the employer had done everything to keep employees from wrongdoing, but this can never be a defence where the claim is based on vicarious liability. Even the most careful employer will not be successful with this defence. If there is a sufficiently close relationship between the wrongdoer's acts and the business of the employer, the employer may be held vicariously liable without being at fault.
The close connection test was applied not only in the case of an employer being a state department which owes a constitutional duty to the public, but also in the case of employers in the private sector. This was illustrated in Grobler v Naspers, 103 in which Naspers was held liable for the damages of a victim who was sexually harassed by a manager employed by Naspers.
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In the case of a claim against a church for the sexual assault on a child by a priest, the court will apply the close connection test as developed by the Constitutional Court. The court will without doubt follow the judgments in Canada and the United Kingdom regarding the exact duties of the priest, the authority bestowed on the priest by the church, which could have facilitated the wrongful act, and the vulnerability of the victim.
Prescription of stale claims
In cases of historical sexual abuse of children, claimants who institute action years after the wrongful acts do so because they want acknowledgment of the fact that a wrong has been done to them and need an apology, which the defendant or wrongdoer is not always willing to give. within normal time limits, as will be discussed below.
Canada
In
106 a case of incest brought 25 years after the complainant was assaulted and raped by her father, the Canada Supreme Court held that:
The tort claim, although subject to limitations legislation, does not accrue until the plaintiff is reasonably capable of discovering the wrongful nature of the defendant's acts and the nexus between those acts and the plaintiff's injuries. In this case, that discovery occurred only when the appellant entered therapy, and the lawsuit was commenced promptly thereafter … Various psychological and emotional harms immediately beset the victim of incest, but much of the damage is latent and extremely debilitating. When the damages begin to become apparent, the causal connection between the incestuous activity and present psychological injuries is often unknown to the victim. A statute of limitations provides little incentive for an incest victim to prosecute his or her action in a timely fashion if the victim has been rendered psychologically incapable of recognizing that a cause of action exists.
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Although this case was about incest, the causes for the delay in bringing a claim are essentially the same as in the case of sexual assault by non-family members.
The court in M(K) v M(H) applied the common law "reasonable discoverability rule", which has the implication that the limitations period should start running only when the victim "discovers" the harm done to her and its likely cause. The court emphasised that the fact that the subjective shifting of the responsibility for the assaults to the wrongdoer (instead of the victim blaming herself) usually happens only during psychotherapy. The court's view was that this creates a presumption that incest victims will discover the necessary connection between their injuries and the wrong done to provides that prescription does not run against claimants if it is impossible in fact for them to act by themselves or to be represented by others. This was interpreted by the court to mean that even though it was impossible for the claimant to act because of her psychological condition, it was not impossible for her parents to do so. The court held that they could have claimed even though they had been requested to refrain from doing so, since they were aware of the link between the sexual assaults and the behavioural problems of their daughter. 117 Chamberland JCA held in a dissenting opinion that the claim had not prescribed, since:
… prescription simply cannot run when the cause of action has not yet crystallised. So, in this case, the appellant alleges that she had no knowledge until June 2006, due to a triggering event which was very specific and which occurred at this time, of the link between psychological difficulties and the acts committed by the respondent Lachance 25 years earlier.
118
As to the knowledge of the parents, Chamberland JCA was of the view that testimony must be heard on whether the parents were aware that the claimant's only on the complainants' eighteenth birthday. 
The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, in terms of section 11 of the Statute of Limitations Act 1980
(hereafter Limitations Act), prescription will run for three years from the date on which the debt accrued or on the date of knowledge (if later) of the person injured.
According to section 14(1), the "date of knowledge" is the date upon which the claimant first had knowledge of various facts, including "that the injury … was significant". An injury is "significant" in terms of section 14(2) if the person would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.
The court in A v Hoare 122 dealt with five cases of historical sexual abuse brought outside the limitation period. The court held that section 14(2) could not be interpreted to accommodate a subjective test of the mental state of the victim to extend the limitation period. The court thus favoured an objective test in interpreting section 14(2), which meant that prescription would run in the normal way. The court remarked that 123 "that does not mean that the law regards as irrelevant the question of whether the actual claimant, taking into account his psychological state in consequence of the injury, could reasonably have been expected to institute proceedings". The court held that the psychological state of the claimant should rather be dealt with in terms of section 33 of the Limitations Act, which gives the court a discretion to extend the period when it is equitable to do so.
Section 33 of the Limitations Act 1980 provides that:
(1) If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which -(a) the provisions … of this Act prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents; the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates.
The interests of both the claimant and the defendant must thus be taken into account by the court before exercising its discretion to extend the period for a claim.
Section 33 further specifically provides in subsection (3)(a) that one of the matters to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion is the reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff. This opens the door for the mental state of a victim of sexual abuse to be taken into account. However, the court is obliged to also have regard to the extent to which the evidence is likely to be less cogent as a result of the delay. However, the court declined to exercise its jurisdiction in terms of section 33 in EL v The Children's Society, 126 a case of child abuse brought almost 50 years after the acts. Because of the fact-sensitivity of cases of this kind, the long lapse of time, the fact that the wrongdoer (who committed suicide) as well as some of the witnesses were deceased, and that the memories of other witnesses failed them, the court was not prepared to extend the normal period for claims.
The application of the "objective date of knowledge" test of section 14 by the courts was seen by some as a positive development in creating certainty. However, concerns were raised because of the generous application of section 33, especially in Raggett, where there were delays of many decades. 
South Africa
The Extinctive prescription shall run in respect of any action for damages, except defamation, from the date on which the wrong for the claim for damages has been based was first brought to the knowledge of the creditor or from the date on which the creditor could reasonably have been expected to have knowledge of such wrong, whichever is the earlier date.
Although the court a quo held that her claim had prescribed three years after the attainment of majority, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that since prescription started to run only when the identity of the wrongdoer was "first brought to the knowledge of the creditor," this presupposes a creditor who can appreciate that a particular person is responsible for the wrong. According to the court, there were valid reasons why the claimant did not realise who was responsible for the wrong done to her.
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The claimant testified that she did not know that she had a claim. Until she was in her forties, she believed that the assault and rapes, which took place over a period of eight years, were her own fault. Only after she listened to a programme in which Oprah Winfrey said that she herself had been sexually assaulted as a child, and Van Zijl realised that Winfrey was not ashamed of the fact, did she realise that the acts were not her fault and that the wrongdoer was responsible for the acts. A debt shall not deem to be due until the creditor has knowledge of the identity of the debtor and of the facts from which the debt arises provided that the creditor shall be deemed to have the knowledge if he could have acquired it had he exercised reasonable care.
In terms of the amendment, subsection 4 now provides that:
Prescription shall not commence in respect of a debt based on the commission of an alleged sexual offence as contemplated in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act during the time in which the creditor is unable to institute proceedings because of his or her mental or psychological condition.
Since the amendment, it is no longer necessary for South African courts to rely on a somewhat strained interpretation of the 1969 Prescription Act to allow for a longer period for victims of sexual offences to bring a claim. However, courts will have to establish whether or not the victim who brought the claim late was in reality unable must, in deciding whether it is equitable to extend the period for a claim or not, take the possibility of prejudice to the defendant into account.
Conclusion
In this article I have discussed three questions which courts in Canada and the United Kingdom have grappled with in cases of historical sexual abuse claims based on the vicarious liability of a church for the sexual assault of a child by a priest.
Apart from having to prove that the acts were committed, victims firstly have to prove that the priest was an employee of the church. In the past, courts have held that priests are not employees, since they are servants of God and that the office to which a priest is appointed is thus not reconcilable with an employment contract being concluded, unless this was the express intention of the parties. However, the Although other policy considerations are at play when courts have to decide on vicarious liability, the constitutional rights of victims will play a role in deciding whether it is fair and just to hold the employer liable where there was no intention to create an employment contract.
Regarding sexual assault claims brought many years after the wrongful acts, the courts in all three countries have acknowledged the special mental state of victims of sexual assault, which is an impediment to institute action within legislative time limits for civil actions. Canadian courts have extended the time limits in terms of the "reasonable discoverability rule" in terms of which victims' claims will not prescribe until 
